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The Delegation Grows
We can make no attempt at this time to list com­
pletely the alumni who were elected to high govern­
mental positions in November. We congratulate them
all and hope to bring news of them as we continue
to survey our alumni. As representative of all who
were elected we might mention Governor A. A. Ribi­
coff, LLB'33, of Connecticut; Senator Roman L.
Hruska, '32, of Nebraska; Attorney-General-elect Stan­
ley Mosk, '35, of California, and Congressman-elect
William S. Boylston, JD'50, of Florida.
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a business, to make it impossible for the owner to hide
behind an irresponsible agent. This explanation ap­
plies also to the common-law liability of secret
partners. Furthermore, the rules establishing agents'
fiduciary duties and disabilities represent attempts to
promote responsible action by agents in the interest of
their principals. Again, the rule that agency powers
are ordinarily revocable, even when stated to be ir­
revocable, represents another striking effort to check
the irresponsible action which might result from ir­
revocable separation of risk and control. This inter­
pretation explains also the exception to this rule in the
case of powers coupled with an interest or powers
given as security. The exception permits one who
thus participates in the risks of the enterprise to be
given irrevocably a share in its control.
These rules reflect concern lest responsible manage­
ment be jeopardized by arrangements separating risk,
control, and profit. They leave great freedom, how­
ever, for the allocation of these elements. For ex­
ample, one who lends money or sells goods to a part­
nership may agree to look solely to partnership assets,
thus assuming a share of the enterprise risk. A lender
may agree to take a share of the profits in lieu of
interest, or an employee may do so in lieu of fixed
salary. They thus become participants in both the
profits and the risks of the enterprise, but without shar­
ing the liability of partners. The variety of these
voluntary arrangements for sharing risk, control, and
profit is enormous. As already indicated, a primary
function of the law of business organization is the set­
ting of limits to the possible variations. When the
corporate form of organization is made available by
statute, the principal legislative question is whether
there are special threats to irresponsibility inherent in
the corporate form which require special restraints on
the freedom to allocate risk, control, and profit.
"Philosophies" of corporate statutes reflect divergent
answers to this question. Some of these theories will
first be stated briefly; 'in the next part, representative
statutory provisions will be examined to ascertain the
relative influence of the various theories; and then we
should be in a position to consider whether there is a
dominant philosophy of the "new look."
1. The first contemporary theory which I shall con­
sider is the theory that a corporation statute should be
merely an "enabling act." Under this theory, the
privilege of incorporation with "limited liability"
should be made freely available, and promoters should
have freedom in defining the scope of the enterprise
and in allocating risk, control, and profit through the
corporation's security structure. This theory prescribes
also that relatively unhampered procedures should
be available to meet changing conditions by effecting
changes in corporate purposes and security structures.
No special conditions on the use of the corporate
form are deemed necessary. This theory implies that
decisions for commitment of funds are the individual
responsibility of the investor or lender, protected,
however, by the law of deceit. Adherence to the
agreed allocation of risks is deemed adequately as­
Slued by the rules of contracts and fraudulent convey­
ances; management loyalty is adequately promoted by
the rules concerning fiduciary duties and disabilities.
This theory reflects also a skepticism as to the
effectiveness of protective devices suggested by alter­
native theories. It is feared also that incomplete
legislative protections may result in relaxation of in­
dividual efforts at self-protection, efforts which are
deemed indispensable if investment decisions are to
be responsibly made.
Advocates of the "enabling act" theory reject the
notion that a ccrporation statute should deal with the
problem of possible monopoly. This theory, therefore,
c3.11s for no limitations of size, duration, purposes, or
general powers."
The "enabling act" theory does not mean that an
adequate corporation statute can be simple and brief.
To serve effectively as an enabling act, it must make
its grants of power and its authorized procedures suf­
ficiently detailed to minimize doubts, including doubts
which might arise from previous statutes and their
judicial interpretation.
2. The second theory, like the first, is grounded on
the premise that the social interest is best served
through responsible individual decisions in the further­
ance of individual interests. The second, however,
reflects a belief that for corporate organization, the
basic common-law doctrines of contracts, torts, and
agency are inadequate to assure responsible individual
decision, that these doctrines should be elaborated and
supplemented at various points to make it less likely
that agreements as to division of risk, control, and
profit may be inadvisedly made or ineffectually im­
plemented.
For example, to provide a setting for responsible in-
